As a Jew with sympathies for Israel and the Palestinians,  I did not expect to agree with much in Jamal Bittar’s commentary, “Israel will not last for more than 30 years,” (July 3-9, p. 10). But as I read past the title, I found myself in agreement with several of his points: that the 19th century equation of ethnic identities with nations and states fostered the emergence of Jewish nationalism, i.e. Zionism; that this Jewish ethnic nationalism has created suffering and injustice for Palestinians; that demographic realities increasingly complicate the prospects for a two-state solution under which Israel could remain a democratic Jewish state; and that the ideal solution will include equality, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence.

What is the central obstacle to such a solution? For Bittar, it is Israelis’ “outmoded” “ethnic nationalism,” the “bronze age superstition” “that Jews must have their own ethnic state.”  This ethnic nationalism is “no longer relevant today,” and it “drives [Jews’] hysterical fear is of annihilation.”  Once Jews give up their claim to a state of their own, Bittar suggests, they will be able “to live peacefully with the Palestinians in a modern democratic state.”

I applaud Jamal Bittar for acknowledging Jewish fears as an important factor in the conflict, but what I find most troubling is how easily he dismisses these fears at the same time. An outmoded, superstitious ethnic nationalism drives these fears, he says. I think it is more the other way around: fears drive ethnic nationalism, and these fears are hardly superstitious.

Jewish fears are based partly on a long history, including centuries of vulnerability and persecution as a religious minority under Christian and Muslim rule. Either the Holocaust or the mid-20th century expulsions from Arab countries are part of most Israelis’ family history. To be sure, these traumatic experiences sometimes distort their perceptions of the present. But has the world changed so much in recent years that the lessons Israelis draw from them are simply irrelevant?

Most readers of this newspaper probably know far better than I do that the Middle East has not yet become an oasis of democracy and human rights even for the majority religious and ethnic groups, let alone for religious and ethnic minorities. A few news items from recent months underline the current status of minority rights.

March 12: In Egypt, where Copts must gain special permission, rarely granted, to build or renovate churches, Muslim residents of the city of Marsa Matrouh threw stones at Christian construction workers who were building a fence around a church-owned lot, leading to wide-scale fighting. The rioters thought the laborers were blocking off the site to build a new church. Eighteen homes were completely destroyed, while 400 Copts barricaded themselves in their church for 10 hours until the frenzy died out.

March 21: In Syria, where one in six of the 1.75 million Kurds have been arbitrarily denied citizenship status for decades, government security forces fired on a crowd of 5,000 that was celebrating the Kurdish festival of Nowruz. Three people, including a 15-year-old girl, were killed. Over 50 were injured. Dozens of injured civilians were held incommunicado by the authorities following the events.

July 12: The International Criminal Court issued a second warrant for the arrest of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, this time for three counts of genocide. Last year, after the ICC issued its first warrant, Arab rulers meeting at the annual Arab League summit gave Bashir a warm welcome, with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas expressing his “solidarity” for “fraternal Sudan and President Omar al-Bashir.”

While the appropriateness of the ICC’s actions on Sudan is open to debate, Arab leaders’ reactions reveal once again their priorities: Arab solidarity and the sovereign right of states to mistreat their citizens without external interference are more important than the protection of non-Arab minorities. The Arab Coalition for Darfur has been working to reverse these priorities, but its success remains to be seen.

The situation of Jews in a united Israel/Palestine, where they might be about half the population, would be different in important ways from that of Copts in Egypt, Kurds in Syria, or non-Arab Darfuris in Sudan. But Hamas, which Bittar suggests is unfairly demonized, hardly seems to be preparing Palestinian Muslims for peaceful coexistence with Jews or others. Jalal Ghazi recently wrote in this newspaper of Palestinian Christians’ growing sense of disenfranchisement under Hamas: “we are losing our rights,” said Reverend Alex Awad. Just last month, Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV broadcast a Friday sermon by a preacher who warned:

“Whoever believes that our battle with the Jews and the Crusaders has subsided or is dormant is living in delusions…. the conflict continues and will continue until the Day of Judgment … Their [the Jews’] annihilation and the destruction of their state will only be achieved through Islam, by those who bow before Allah.”

If you were a Jew, would you feel safe living in a state where a leading political movement, supported by a substantial part of the electorate, promises your people’s annihilation?

Jamal Bittar may well be right that the only feasible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will ultimately involve the two peoples joining together in some sort of bi-national polity. But belittling Jewish fears as “hysterical” “bronze age superstitions” does nothing to advance the prospects for such a solution. What could help would be efforts to understand those fears and to support those Palestinians and Arabs working for human rights and minority rights in Arab countries—just as Israelis must likewise work to understand Palestinian experiences and aspirations.

The writer teaches at Wayne State University and is using a pseudonym. Jamal Bittar is a professor at the University of Toledo in Ohio.